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Abstract 
 
The paper reflects on the impact of the counter-terror agenda on humanitarian actions. It explores 
the socio-political and legal implications and constraints that Non-Governmental Organisations in-
cur when managing humanitarian projects in critical environments such as Somalia where, an im-
portant famine stroke in 2011 as consequence of the counter-terror agenda, insecurity and politici-
zation. In the case of Somalia, Al-Shabaab, a group well-known to the international authority as affil-
iated to Al-Qaeda was in charge of the area in which the famine stroke. The dilemma to consider in 
this paper is  paper is related to the binomial situation between the people in need and the counter-
terrorism strategy against Al-Shabaab. The paper outlines three issues that the humanitarian actors 
incur, namely structural, operational and of internal nature. These three issues undermines the rela-
tionship between the Humanitarian actors and the donors as well as between humanitarian actors 
and their recipients. At the end, the relationship continues to be highly controversial.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper will reflect on an im-
portant aspect of the Humanitarian action 
in contested environments. Specifically, 
the impact of counter-terror legislation 
created to avoid material support to For-
eign Terrorist Organizations(FTOs). The-
se legislations have been made to avoid 
that FTOs are able to acquire material of 
any kind to support their subversive or 
destructive activities of terrorism. Conse-
quently, the situation becomes more com-
plex when considering the areas in which 
these organizations act. Specifically, the 
example of Somalia is exemplary to out-
line the blurring line between terrorist 
groups and civilians and how often ter-
rorist organizations control humanitarian 
access to areas where people are in need. 
In this sense, the importance of exploring 
this aspect is essential to point out how 
counter-terror agenda creates substantial 
issues for humanitarian actors to access 
such areas.  
The impact of the counter-terror 
agenda on humanitarian actions and will 
be using examples from the case study of 
Somalia. The counter-terror agenda refers 
to the profound effect that the September 
11, 2001 terror attack has had on the 
United States’ foreign policy, and how it 
has changed the landscape in which hu-
manitarian agencies have acted and 
adapted. Specifically, the impact of coun-
ter-terrorism laws have undermined the 
relationship between humanitarian agen-
cies and their donors, as well as their re-
cipients, resulting in an environment in 
which upholding the principles of neutral-
ity, impartiality and independence have 
become more complicated. In this sense, 
the use of the case study of Somalia is 
propaedeutic to explaining the difficulties 
that counter-terror legislation has applied 
to humanitarian actors and, consequently, 
to their actions. In this context, the famine 
in 2011 has largely been caused by an en-
vironment in which counter-terror legis-
lation, politicization of aid and insecurity 
have forced multiple international hu-
manitarian actors to leave the country, 
including the World Food Program (WFP) 
which officially withdrew from Somalia in 
2010 on the premises that the shipped aid 
was being redirected and sold for terror-
ism purposes against Western targets. 
This paper is divided into two parts; the 
first highlights the consequences of 9/11 
on humanitarian law and how the approv-
als of counter-terror laws and policies 
have deeply compromised not only the 
environment in which humanitarian or-
ganizations work but also the principles 
of neutrality, impartiality and independ-
ence. The second discusses the implica-
tion of counter-terror laws on three main 
levels of the humanitarian work, namely: 
structural, internal and operational and 
address how such implications have con-
strained the humanitarian work in Soma-
lia.  
RESEARCH METHODS 
The paper has been written on the 
basis of current primary and secondary 
sources that address the political and le-
gal constrains of humanitarian agencies in 
contested areas such as Somalia. The pa-
per has used reports from multiple Hu-
manitarian sources such as the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross to 
point out the impact of Counter-terrorism 
laws over humanitarian work. It has been 
used to point out specific restrictions and 
bans imposed to avoid that humanitarian 
aid is diverted towards alternative ends. 
 In this sense, the use of reports 
from multiple humanitarian institutes 
have outlined the pressure imposed by 
statutes to humanitarian actors. Specifi-
cally, the use of humanitarian reports has 
been important to understand a more 
practical prospective due to the direct 
presence on the ground of humanitarian 
personnel or their direct involvement 
with the Somali people as well as their 
presence during the negotiations with US 
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officials. The paper has also used a series 
of Legal sources specifically from the US 
government to point out the material re-
strictions on humanitarian agencies in 
contested environments such as Somalia.  
In this sense, the use of resources 
from the Office of Counterterrorism of the 
United States is propaedeutic to the role 
of the legal framework as a tool to pres-
sure the humanitarian agencies. The pa-
per has also focused on the situation in 
Somalia through the use of  a series of re-
ports from World Food Program, Global 
Food Security and development-related 
journals to discuss the practical implica-
tions of the counter-terrorism policies in 
Somalia.  
 RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The paper outlines three main is-
sues with counter-terrorism legislation 
on humanitarian action. These issues are 
of structural, operational and internal na-
ture. First, structural issues have mined 
the relationship between humanitarian 
actors and their donors, particularly with 
the United States. This has been the case 
for the WFP withdrawal from South-
Central Somalia. 
 Second, the operational issues, the-
se have outlined the difficulty of applying 
counter-terrorism legislation to humani-
tarian actors in contested areas and how 
it can affect the operability of NGOs and 
international organizations; specifically, 
this paper demonstrates how counter-
terrorism legislation has been too rigid to 
deal with Al-Shabaab’s obstructionist pol-
icies. Al-Shabaab has been able to impose 
payment of fees and taxes on humanitari-
an actors causing legal issues for poten-
tially infringing laws that prohibit materi-
al support for FTOs.  
Third, on the internal issue, lack of 
coordination and transparent discussions 
among humanitarian partners and inter-
national organizations have undermined 
the way humanitarian actors can work in 
a high-risks and contested environemnt 
in which they will need to deal with sup-
plying local people with humanitarian re-
lief projects, but also with an armed FTO 
that is openly supporting Al-Qaeda and its 
mission against the Westn.  
This has therefore removed any op-
portunity to discuss the lack of coordina-
tion in contested areas and direct the pro-
jects more accurately and with a direct 
management policy. This has consequent-
ly caused the lack of open discussions to 
address the constant scarcity of food that 
fuelled the 2011 famine in the country. 
Put it bluntly, the responsibilities in ad-
dressing insecurity, aid diversion and hu-
manitarian delivery of projects issues 
have been quietly put aside in order to 
keep donors and public opinion more fa-
vourable to funding them. 
The first part of this paper will cover 
how counter-terrorism laws have become 
an important aspect to consider when hu-
manitarian actors engage in relief projects 
in conflict-affected societies.  In analysing 
counter-terror policies, it is therefore es-
sential to firstly define it. Counter-
terrorism legislation encompass a broad 
number of topics; in this paper, it refers to 
the deterrence of and prevention of ter-
rorist acts ‘and preventing terrorist 
groups from accessing resources that sup-
port their terrorist acts as well as to pre-
vent people from undertaking so-called 
preparatory acts of terrorism such as at-
tending terrorist training camps, raising 
or laundering funds for terrorist activi-
ties, and inciting terrorist at-
tacks’ (Burniske, Modirzadeh, & Lewis, 
2014).   
Since 9/11, states have developed 
sophisticated domestic and international 
counter-terrorism laws in order to mini-
mize the material and financial support 
that terrorist groups can obtain from for-
eign individuals or countries. There have 
been 18 multilateral treaties regarding 
counter-terror laws and one of the most 
relevant is the ‘International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Available Online at http://journal.unismuh.ac.id/index.php/otoritas 
Otoritas : Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, 7 (2),  October 2017, 78 
Copyright © 2017, Otoritas : Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, ISSN: 2088-3706 (Print), ISSN: 2502-9320 (Online)  
Terrorism’ (International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Ter-
rorism, 2001).  This treaty posed the basis 
upon which no material, financial, sup-
port was to be given to foreign terrorist 
organizations. 
It states that any person commits an 
offence within the meaning of this Con-
vention if that person by any means, di-
rectly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilful-
ly, provides or collects funds with the in-
tention that they should be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in full 
or in part, in order to carry out An act 
which constitutes an offence within the 
scope of and as defined in one of the trea-
ties listed in the annex; or Any other act 
intended to cause death or serious bodily 
injury to a civilian, or to any other person 
not taking an active part in the hostilities 
in a situation of armed conflict, when the 
purpose of such act, by its nature or con-
text, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from do-
ing any act (International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Ter-
rorism, 2001). 
Since 1999, the United Nations Secu-
rity Council (UNSC) approved two im-
portant resolutions in light of the bomb-
ing of US embassies in East Africa and the 
9/11 attack. These resolutions are UNSCR 
1198 and UNSCR 1373. Resolution UNSCR 
1373 is therefore important for the pur-
pose of this paper and it requires UN 
members to ‘Prohibit their nationals or 
any persons and entities within their ter-
ritories from making any funds, financial 
assets or economic resources or financial 
or other related services available, direct-
ly or indirectly, or the benefit of persons 
who commit or attempt to commit or fa-
cilitate or participate in the commission 
of terrorist acts, of entities owned or con-
trolled, directly or indirectly, by such per-
sons and of persons and entities acting on 
behalf of or at the direction of such per-
sons[.](International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism, 2001). 
From these UNSCR resolutions, the 
UNSC introduced a number of sanctions 
regimes that target specific groups world-
wide that are seen to be a threat to peace 
and security. For instance, in relation to 
Somalia, ‘these target specific non-state 
armed groups,  including Al-Shabaab and 
its associates(under the UN Security 
Council Resolution 733 of 1992) that de-
spite not being necessarily characterised 
as counter-terrorism measures, the indi-
viduals subject to UN sanctions are often 
brought within the ambit of national 
counter-terrorist laws’ (Pantuliano, Mack-
intosh, Elhawary,  & Metcalfe, 2011). In 
this context, Somalia is currently subject-
ed to arms embargo, travel ban, assets 
freeze and Charcoal ban that are ap-
proved by the UNSC pursuant of UNSCR 
75(1992) and 1907(2009) (United Na-
tions Security Council Subsidiary Organs, 
2009). 
 The paper will move now to the 
specific analysis of the main body of laws 
that plays an important role in its reflec-
tions, namely those of the United States. 
The choice of this country is based upon 
the following elements: first, the US is at 
the forefront of counter-terrorism laws 
and also directly related to the humani-
tarian actors as the biggest contributor of 
humanitarian aid, totalling $50.1bn in for-
eign aid and $18bn in humanitarian assis-
tance worldwide (Foreign Assistance 
Budget, 2017). Second, the US code could 
potentially be one of the most adverse im-
pacts on humanitarian organizations 
(Pantuliano, Mackintosh, Elhawary, & 
Metcalfe, 2011).   
In relation to humanitarian assis-
tance, the impact of 9/11 has seen an in-
crease of counter-terror laws within the 
US penal code due to the approval of the 
USA PATRIOT Act that broadens the basis 
upon which material and financial sup-
port to foreign terrorist organizations 
(FTOs) is consolidated; it states that ‘any 
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property tangible or intangible, or service, 
including currency or monetary instru-
ments or financial security, financial ser-
vices, lodging, training, expert advice or 
assistance, safe house, false documenta-
tion or identification, communication 
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal sub-
stances, explosives, personnel (1 or more 
individuals who may be or include one-
self), and transportation, except medicine 
or religious materials’ (Doyle, 2010).   
In the light of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
the FTOs that are covered by the ban are 
designated and ‘chosen by the Secretary 
of State, as foreign organisations which 
engage in terrorism and threaten the se-
curity of the US or its nationals’ (Office of 
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 1999).  
In addition to the Patriotic Act, the Execu-
tive Order 13224 signed by President 
Bush in the aftermath of 9/11 allows the 
Department of the Treasury’s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to ‘block 
entities, freeze assets, place individuals 
on the ‘Special Designated Nationals’ list 
(SDNs) and identifies ‘Specially Designat-
ed Global Terrorists’ (SDGTs) as well as 
prohibits the export and donations of 
products designated to relieve human suf-
fering, specifically food, clothing and med-
icine’’(Modirzadeh, Dustin, & Bruderlein, 
2011).  All these laws have therefore put 
pressure on humanitarian actors and 
have compromised how they uphold the 
principles of neutrality, impartiality and 
independence. 
The counter-terrorism laws ana-
lysed above have therefore imposed strict 
rules and regulations for humanitarian 
agencies in funding agreements. Donors 
have addressed their national counter-
terrorism laws through the creation of 
broad risk-management schemes with 
relevant guidelines that non-
governmental organizations have to fol-
low. These schemes insist that humanitar-
ian actors are not only aware of proce-
dures to mitigate the risks of funding-
diversion, but also donors ‘have acknowl-
edged the increased administration and 
bureaucracy that counter-terrorism 
measures have imposed on implementing 
partners’ (Mackintosh & Duplat, 2013). 
Specifically, the United States has 
imposed a series of clauses that ensure 
that no funds would bring material sup-
port to terrorists. Mackintosh and Duplat 
have reported that ‘‘the language em-
ployed in these clauses in terms of re-
quired action on the part of humanitarian 
actors includes ‘’best endeavours’’, 
’appropriate steps’ and ’to the best of its 
knowledge’ leaving the humanitarian ac-
tors to interpret the potential conse-
quences for their liabilities or funding 
cuts’’ (Mackintosh & Duplat (2013). 
Accordingly, donors also include 
clauses that impose requirements on hu-
manitarian actors to report in which man-
ners and where the money was used, and 
the contacts they acquired on ground. 
This has therefore raised serious ques-
tions regarding the neutrality of their hu-
manitarian action. For instance, Burniske 
et al. report that the United States Associ-
ation for International Development 
(USAID) requires that the implementing 
partners are not only in compliance with 
the procedures, but it also requires them 
to notify the agency if transactions to 
FTOs have occurred ‘‘including a descrip-
tion of any ‘safeguards and procedures’, 
including oversight systems, that were in 
place to help avoid the occurrence of such 
events’’ (Burniske, Modirzadeh, & Dustin,  
2014).  
In other words, counter-terrorism 
laws have profoundly influenced risk-
management and risk-mitigation schemes 
in high-risk environments. Consequently, 
these clauses are made to control not only 
how and where the funds are spent by the 
implementing partners, but work also in 
favour of the war on terror through the 
localization of FTOs and affiliated non-
armed groups within the country or the 
region.  
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This second part of the paper will 
move on to demonstrate how counter-
terrorism laws have profoundly impacted 
the role of humanitarian actors in Soma-
lia. Somalia is an important case study for 
three reasons. First, ‘throughout Somalia’s 
20-year crisis, the relationship between 
ongoing, routinized emergency relief op-
erations and episodic but intense stabili-
sation interventions has been conten-
tious’ (Menkhaus, 2010). 
Second, it has been the battle 
ground for an Ethiopian invasion in 2008, 
a multilateral peacekeeping intervention 
by African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) and a ‘destructive insurgency 
and counter-insurgency campaign, inten-
sification of Al-Qaeda activities and coun-
ter-terrorism actions by the United States 
and a profound humanitarian cri-
sis’ (Menkhaus, 2010).  Third, Somalia ex-
periences a unique political context, in 
which a declared Al-Qaeda affiliated-
group, Al-Shabaab, was de-facto in control 
of Central and South Somalia where the 
2011 famine struck killing 260,000 peo-
ple including 133,000 children (Ford, 
2017).   
In this context, humanitarian agen-
cies found themselves to be working in an 
environment plagued by security risks for 
their personnel due to Al-Shabaab attacks 
and kidnappings. In addition to difficul-
ties in accessing the population in need 
due to Al-Shabaab’s obstructionist poli-
cies, and an international community of 
donors, especially the United States, 
which was growing impatient of allowing 
Al-Shabaab to divert part of WFP food as-
sistance to finance terrorism activities in 
the country.  
Counter-terror laws have, therefore, 
been a direct cause of the 2011 famine. In 
this sense, there are three levels on which 
counter-terror law have influenced the 
way humanitarian actors operate in So-
malia and therefore contributed to deteri-
orate the situation on the ground. First, 
‘structural, affecting the framework of ac-
tion itself and the standard operating pro-
cedures for humanitarian organizations; 
second, operational, affecting program-
matic decisions; third, internal, affecting 
the functioning of and coordination be-
tween humanitarian actors’ (Mackintosh 
& Duplat, 2013).   
In terms of structural impact, this 
refers to the ability of humanitarian ac-
tors to uphold the principles of impartiali-
ty, neutrality and independence in their 
engagement with local actors. This has 
become an important issue not only for 
humanitarian organizations, but also for 
donors, financing partners and contrac-
tors, specifically the United States, due to 
aid-diversion towards Al-Shabaab. By 
2008, three major food aid operations 
were operative in the country, namely 
CARE, WFP and the International Com-
mittee for the Red Cross, ‘WFP and CARE 
covered the needs of nearly 2 million peo-
ple in Somalia’ (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 
2012).  
By the end of 2009, CARE withdrew 
while WFP was investigating aid-
diversion through corrupted local trans-
porters. The UN Monitoring Group’s 2010 
report detailed specific episodes in which 
local contractors colluded with Al-
Shabaab militia to divert WFP food pack-
ages towards black markets in order to 
buy weapons (Gettleman, 2010). 
It also reported that almost 50% of 
WFP food packages had been diverted to 
implementing partners and local militias, 
and then sold to local markets for profit 
(UN Monitoring Group, United Nations 
Official Document, 2010).  This situation 
brought WFP to temporarily, and then 
permanently, stop the delivery of food 
packages in Central and South Somalia by 
the beginning of 2010.  
Menkhaus reports that the US Ad-
ministration’s growing ‘legal concern that 
the provision of any material benefit to a 
designated terrorist group in contraven-
tion of the US Patriot Act and related 
counter-terrorism legislation would have 
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made USAID officials potentially liable of 
prosecutions under US penal 
code’ (Menkhaus, 2010).  In addition, the 
US Administration was accused of using 
humanitarian aid for political purposes in 
order to downgrade Al-Shabaab’s capabil-
ities to launch terrorist plots from Soma-
lia through the imposition of harsh condi-
tions to humanitarian partners in ex-
change for more assurances that food de-
livery would not be diverted (Gettleman, 
2010).   
However, humanitarian actors in 
Somalia were practically unable to pro-
vide more assurances ‘’calling south-
Central Somalia an ‘accountability free-
zone’ in which they possess only modest 
monitoring capacities’’ (Menkhaus, 2010).  
This situation was due to insecurity on 
the ground that constrained humanitarian 
NGOs to leave Somalia and control their 
projects from Nairobi; this has therefore 
contributed to the so-called ‘remote pro-
gramming’ or ‘remote management’ sys-
tem which sees humanitarian actors em-
ploying local staff to oversee the imple-
mentation of their programmes in Soma-
lia (Abild, 2010).  This brought NGOs to 
be unable to perform risk-assessment and 
project-impact analysis on the communi-
ties in Somalia. 
In terms of operational issues, these 
include changes or restrictions on human-
itarian actors to access specific areas due 
to donors’ or risk concerns. In this sense, 
the primary mission for humanitarian ac-
tors is to access the population in need 
and this means finding ‘an implicit agree-
ment with the fighting parties’ that allows 
them to operate based on needs and neu-
trality (Pantuliano, Mackintosh, Elhawary, 
& Metcalfe, 2011).  However, this has 
brought some benefits to the fighting par-
ties, as, humanitarian actors are required 
to pay fees or taxes to the local non-state 
armed group. In this situation, contrac-
tors and partners that have been granted 
funds and permission by USAID or the 
State Department to operate in Somalia 
have to declare the expenditures, through 
detailed reports, and ask for authoriza-
tion from OFAC for large amounts in such 
volatile environments (Pantuliano, Mack-
intosh, Elhawary, & Metcalfe, 2011).  
In Somalia, humanitarian actors had 
to compromise with Al-Shabaab, which 
started to adopt ‘puzzling, inconsistent, 
and self-defeating’ policies thereby mak-
ing it harder for aid agencies to physically 
access famine-affected areas (Menkhaus, 
2012).  Moreover, Al-Shabaab imposed an 
average fee of $90,000 per aid agency 
every six months putting under pressure 
the humanitarian actors who had to re-
port these large pay cheques to the OFAC 
and therefore making themselves liable 
under the US penal system for giving ma-
terial support to a designated FTO 
(United Nations Monitoring Groups, 
2011).  In this situation, NGOs required 
written assurances from the US govern-
ment to protect their status on the 
ground; however, ‘humanitarian lawyers 
concluded that the written assurances of-
fered by the US government did not in fact 
provide them with adequate legal protec-
tion, and that verbal assurances meant 
nothing’ (Acuto, 2014). 
In terms of internal issues within 
humanitarian organizations, counter-
terrorism legislation increases the bu-
reaucratic burden and lack of transparen-
cy among implementing humanitarian 
partners, with specific focus on a lack of 
coordination. In the case of Somalia, the 
aforementioned conditions and specifical-
ly the agreements which humanitarian 
actors were forced to make to access the 
population in need in Central and South 
Somalia have created the conditions for 
lacking a coordinated approach to food 
relief. For instance, WFP, CARE and ICRC 
were providing food in three independent 
operations. This situation was dependent 
on the fact that no clear and transparent 
discussion was requested between do-
nors and humanitarian actors. ‘Agencies 
have been reluctant to share information 
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at cluster meetings and other coordina-
tion fora ’ (Pantuliano, Mackintosh, El-
hawary, & Metcalfe, 2011).   
In doing so, it has quietly and pas-
sively accepted that dealing with Al-
Shabaab required agreements that would 
be able to create criminal allegations 
against humanitarian actors. In this situa-
tion, what has been extremely important 
for humanitarian actors is the so-called 
‘reputational harm’ that could potentially 
provoke deep losses not only in terms of 
‘how they would address a public rela-
tions campaign accusing them of viola-
tions of counter-terrorism laws, such as 
providing support to terrorists with tax-
payers funds’, but also in terms of the 
confidence of donors, which would make 
them more reticent ‘to funds actors that 
may be engaged in allegedly negligent or 
criminal activity’ (Burniske, Modirzadeh, 
& Dustin, 2014).  
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this paper has tried to 
analyse the impact of counter-terrorism 
agenda on humanitarian actors. The pa-
per has, firstly, highlighted the primary 
body of laws that make counter-terrorism 
an imperative for states worldwide. It has 
therefore emphasized that 9/11 and the 
War on Terror have played an important 
role not only in the case study of Somalia, 
but also in vehemently impacting the en-
vironment in which humanitarian NGOs 
work.  
There have been three main issues 
with counter-terrorism legislation on hu-
manitarian action: structural, operational 
and internal. Structural issues have un-
dermined the relationship between hu-
manitarian actors and their donors, par-
ticularly with the United States. This has 
been the case in the WFP withdrawal 
from South-Central Somalia. Second, on 
operational issues, it has highlighted how 
counter-terrorism legislation can affect 
the areas of operation of humanitarian 
actors; specifically, this paper has demon-
strated how counter-terrorism legislation 
has been an issue in dealing with Al-
Shabaab’s obstructionist policies. Gaining 
access upon payment of fees or taxes has 
put the humanitarian actors on the spot 
for potentially infringing laws that pro-
hibit material support for FTOs.  
Third, on the internal issue, lack of 
coordination and transparent discussions 
have strongly affected the way humani-
tarian actors can work in a high-risks con-
text in which they not only need to deal 
with human suffering, but also with an 
FTO that is openly supporting Al-Qaeda. 
This has therefore removed any oppor-
tunity to discuss the issues openly in or-
der to coordinate relief projects and ad-
dress the constant scarcity of food that 
fuelled the 2011 famine in the country. In 
this sense, responsibilities in addressing 
issues have been quietly put aside in or-
der to keep donors and public opinion 
more favourable to funding them. To con-
clude, the counter-terror agenda has be-
come profoundly entangled with 
‘defeating terrorism’.  
This has therefore created issues 
about the way humanitarian actors up-
hold their values. In addition, counter-
terrorism legislation does not exempt nor 
protect humanitarian actors from being 
prosecuted under criminal law and this 
remains a major concern for NGOs acting 
in FTO-controlled areas.  
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